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This paper is an empirical study of the determinants of
business-cycle comovement. Using a panel of European countries
(1972-2004) it is found that bilateral trade intensity is a robust
determinant of real comovement in Europe, this confirming the
seminal study by Frankel and Rose (1998). It is also found that
convergence in macroeconomic policies (especially fiscal policies)
is associated to high degree of intra-european business-cycle
correlation. Moreover, having controlled for policy convergence, the
effect of bilateral trade on business cycle comovement weakens on
average by a factor of 36%-33% with respect to that estimated
according to Frankel and Rose’s econometric specification, this
suggesting the potential endogeneity of the set of instrumental
variables adopted by the two authors (Gruben, Koo and Millis,
2002). [JEL Classification: F15, F33, E32]
1. - Introduction
One of the main results of the optimum currency area (OCA)
theory is that countries whose frequency of idiosyncratic shocks
is high are less suitable to take part in a fixed exchange rate
regime
1. The reason lies in the idea that joining a currency area
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1 This idea was first put forward by MUNDELL R. (1961) and it was further
explored by KENEN P. (1969). The last 20 years have seen a growing body of articles
in the area of OCA theory, see TAVLAS G. (1994) for a survey. On the empiricallimits the ability of countries to use national monetary policy to
respond to country-specific shocks. This finding has been
successively extended into the environment of a monetary union
2
and it has been one of the main analytical tools adopted by
economists to gauge the economic suitability of the European
monetary unification process. Relying on historical patterns of real
comovement, some authors
3 have argued that the adoption of the
single currency would create macroeconomic stability problems
for the euro zone, especially because of the low degree of intra-
European labor mobility and because of the absence of a federal
risk sharing system.
This view has been criticized by Frankel and Rose (1998).
Applying a Lucas critique to the synchronicity criteria of OCA
theory the two authors have argued that a fixed exchange rate
regime may dramatically change the historical record of real
comovement: indeed, the boost in trade intensity between
countries participating in the currency area may cause their cycles
to be more and more similar. In other words, a currency area may
be self-validating
4, so that ex-ante valuations of its optimality would
be redundant. As an empirical support of their idea, the two
scholars have estimated a positive and wide effect of bilateral trade
intensity on the correlation of cycles between 21 OECD countries.
Frankel and Rose’s study have stimulated a growing body of
empirical literature that has further investigated the determinants
of business-cycle comovement. Perturbation of the basic model (see
in particular Baxter and Kouparitsas, 2005; Imbs, 2004) did not
question the positive “trade effect” although its magnitude has been
RIVISTA DI POLITICA ECONOMICA NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 2006
26
implementation of the criteria of optimum currency area theory see BAYOUMI T. -
EICHENGREEN B. (1997). On the theoretical side, an excellent formalization is
provided by ALESINA A. - BARRO R.J. (2002). 
2 See DE GRAUWE P.  (2000) for a two-country model that studies the efficiency
of the common monetary policy in presence of asymmetries both in the occurrence
of shocks and in the transmission mechanism.
3 On the historical records of symmetry of shocks between European countries
see BAYOUMI T. - EICHENGREEN B. (1993). See OBSTFELD M. - PERI G. (1998) for a
discussion of the links between inter-regional labor mobility, asymmetric shocks
and risk sharing in the European Monetary Union framework.  
4 This terminology is due to CORSETTI G. - PESANTI P.  (2002). In this work, the
two authors have furnished a rationale for a Lucas critique to OCA criteria that
differs from that of Frankel and Rose.partially revisited (Imbs, 2003; Kose, Prasad and Terrones, 2003).
Gruben, Koo and Millis (2002) have argued that omitted variables
bias and endogeneity of the instruments adopted by Frankel and
Rose may produce an overestimation of around 50%. Of course, a
strong downward revision of the effect of bilateral trade on real
comovement may cast some doubts on the economic relevance of
this Lucas critique to the “synchronicity” criteria of OCA theory. 
This paper extends the econometric specification of Frankel
and Rose by considering the role of fiscal and monetary policy
convergence on determining the international co-fluctuation of
cycles. Using a panel of 14 European countries observed between
1972 and 2004 we find that countries having similar fiscal policies
and similar real rates of return are likely to have more
synchronized business cycles. Moreover, it is found that the impact
of bilateral trade on real comovement, although positive and
highly statistically significant, is lower (between 36% and 33%)
than that estimated according to Frankel and Rose’s procedure. 
The paper is organized as follows: Sections 2 and 3 deal with
Frankel and Rose’s endogeneity hypothesis and with a discussion
of their estimation strategy. Section 4 presents the results of our
estimation and some sensitivity analysis. Section 5 concludes,
discussing the main policy implication for the European Monetary
Union.
2. -  Frankel and Rose’s Endogeneity Hypothesis 
A symmetric distribution of shocks has been identified as a
crucial prerequisite for countries to form an optimal currency
area. Frankel and Rose’s idea (1998) consists of considering this
criterion endogenous to the creation of the currency area itself,
making its ex-ante compliance less relevant. Their idea is based
on two main conjectures:
— Fixed exchange rate should promote trade linkages between
countries sharing the agreement;
— A greater extent of trade interdependence should result in
more synchronized business cycles.
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international trade have pointed out that the effect of monetary
unification on trade is positive and statistically significant,
although its magnitude tends to be linked to the econometric
procedure adopted
5. Nevertheless, as far as the direction of the
effect is concerned, there is little empirical ambiguity that a
common currency increases trade linkages between the countries
that adopt it. 
The relation between trade intensity and business-cycle
synchronization seems to be more controversial from the point of
view of economic theory. To formally present the channels through
which trade may affect the comovement of real variables we follow
Frankel ad Rose (1998) assuming that the real growth rate of
output of a country may be expressed as:
(1)
Where {ui} is the deviation of sector i’s  growth rate of output
from the average growth rate of output v at time t, ai is the share
of sector i over total output and g is the trend growth rate of GDP.
All variables are in real terms. By definition, shocks to {ui} are
orthogonal to the average growth rate of output vt. For convenience,
it is assumed that that {uit} is distributed independently across both
sectors
6 and time and that {vt} is distributed independently over
time. 
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5 In particular, cross-sectional studies tend to estimate a “currency union effect”
more sizable than time-series studies do, see GLICK R. - ROSE A. (2002): given the
underlying question (“how much does trade increase when two countries adopt a
common currency?”) the time series approach is more suitable. Another
econometric problem that can heavily affect estimation of the trade effect is that
of reverse causality, as PERSSON T. (2001) highlights. A time series approach which
deals explicitly with the problem of reverse causality is MICCO A. - ORDONEZ G. -
STEIN E. (2003), who have estimated a positive impact of the euro on intra-EMU
trade between 4% and 23%. 
6  In reality, sectors are interdependent so that this assumption appears
restrictive. However, this assumption is not strictly necessary for the empirical
specification of this study: in fact, the regression analysis is based on the estimation
of a reduced form of equation (2). Denoting by y ˜t the de-trended growth rate of output at time t
of a country we have: 
(2)
Equation (2) tells us that the comovement of business cycles
between two countries, “Home” and “Foreign” (denoted by an
asterisk) depends on the specialization pattern of the two
economies, the variability of sector i’s  cycle, and the covariance
between the two countries’ aggregate shocks. Imagining the two
polar cases, equation (2) collapses to
7
(3)
when two countries are fully specialized in the production of two
different goods. In the case of two highly diversified economies
the equation (2) becomes
8 instead: 
(4)
c being the share that each sector has out of the total output and
n the number of industries in the two economies.
As can be inferred from equations (3) and (4), two countries
with a positive relation between {ai} and {a*i} (similar sectoral
composition of output) tend to have more synchronous business
cycles than those with large differences between {ai} and {a*i}
9
(polarized production structure). Moreover, business-cycle
correlation is likely to be positively related to the extent of country-
specific aggregate shocks.
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7 The case of two highly specialized economies amounts to assume ai = 1 a–i
= 0 aj* = 1 a–j* = 0 for i ≠ j.
8 In the case of two highly diversified economies we are assuming that ai =




9 When {ui} are not independent of one another, this may no longer be true.
In fact, it could be in principle possible that countries fully specialized in the
production of two different goods (negative relation between ai and a*i) may have
a large degree of business-cycle comovement if there is positive dependence
between sector specific shocks.There are different channels through which bilateral trade
intensity may affect the extent of business-cycle synchronization. 
A first channel concerns the cyclical behaviour of the trade
balance. When an economy is affected by a negative aggregate
shock it will tend to import less and to export more with its
trading partners: the economic importance of such spill-over
effects depends on the extent of bilateral trade
10. Hence, there is
little ambiguity that trade intensity positively affects the
covariance of country specific aggregate shocks σv,v*. 
A second channel concerns the effect that trade has on a
country’s sectoral composition of output. On the one hand,
reduction of transaction costs may induce countries to specialize
in sectors where they have comparative advantages: in this case,
international trade should induce a divergence of {ai} between
partners. As a result, the extent of similarities in production
structure between countries could in principle be reduced by the
adoption of the single currency, thus leading to more
asynchronous business cycles; this idea has been supported by
Krugman (1993) for the case of the European Monetary
Unification process. On the other hand, the adoption of the
common currency may enhance the similarity of {ai} between
trading partners whenever the boost in trade takes place more
within industries rather than between them. 
Therefore, bilateral trade intensity has ambiguous effects on
the extent of comovement of business cycles, given that its overall
outcome depends on the relative strength of the mechanisms
highlighted above. Frankel and Rose (1998) have tackled
empirically the theoretically ambiguous effect of trade over
business-cycle comovement. The two scholars, using a panel of 21
OECD countries observed between 1959-1993, have estimated the
following equation:
(5) Corr (y ˜, y ˜*) = α+β TRADEt + εt
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10 In particular PRASAD E. - GABLE J. (1997) have pointed out the importance
of “export led” recoveries in the group of industrialized countries, the magnitude
of this effect being proportional to the degree of openness of the economies.Where Corr (y ˜,  y ˜*)t is the correlation coefficient between a
measure of de-trended real activity
11 for a given country pair (e.g.
France-Germany) in sub-period
12 t and TRADEt measures the
intensity of trade linkages for the same country pair in the same
sub-period. Frankel and Rose’s hypothesis of endogeneity should
be read as a hypothesis on the coefficient β. A positive β implies
that the boost in bilateral trade amplifies the extent of
comovement of real variables between countries taking part in the
monetary union. The size of the coefficient identifies the economic
relevance of this phenomenon: a large value of β implies that real
comovement sharply increases after the adoption of the single
currency so that Frankel and Rose’s hypothesis would be
confirmed. Instrumental variable (IV) estimation of equation (5)
produces a positive and sizable effect of bilateral trade intensity
over business-cycle synchronization. This “trade effect” appears
robust with regard to the macroeconomic series used to measure
cross-country real comovement and to the methods adopted to
isolate the trend component of GDP. In one of the benchmark
estimations of the model, an increase in trade intensity by 1
standard deviation increases average real comovement from 0.17
to 0.2775. 
3. -  A Note on Frankel and Rose’s Hypothesis 
The positive and large value of the coefficient β estimated by
Frankel and Rose appears to confirm the endogeneity hypothesis
on the synchronicity criteria of OCA theory. Countries joining a
currency union are likely to experience an increase in trade vis-
à-vis their partners and thus a (strong) increase in the degree of
comovement of their business cycles: as a result, the common
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11 The authors use four different measures of real economic activity: i) real
GDP;  ii) total Employment; iii) unemployment rate; iv) index of industrial
production. Moreover, the authors adopt four different de-trending methodologies:
a) fourth difference; b) H-P filter; c) linear and quadratic de-trending; d) H-P
filtered residuals from a regression of the measure of real economic activity on a
constant and quarterly dummies.
12 The authors split their sample into four equally sized parts.monetary policy will prove to be more efficient over time. This
finding is not only important per se, but it brings about a number
of implications regarding the economic policy institutional design
of a currency area. As far as EMU is concerned, for instance, this
finding indicates that fiscal policy rules may not be as costly as
static OCA criteria based analysis may suggest. It is therefore
crucial to settle the robustness of Frankel and Rose’s findings. This
section discusses the main econometric problems that may arise
in the estimation of equation (5).
3.1 Inconsistency of OLS
The first doubt regards the inconsistency of Ordinary Least
Square (OLS) estimation of equation (5), a point that has been
made by the two authors. There are two broad explanations for
that. First, measurement error in the independent variable
would enable the OLS estimation of the coefficient β to be
biased towards 0. Secondly, bilateral trade intensity can be
considered as endogenous to equation (5). As noted by the
authors, the poor fit of the regression would suggest a “true”
model of the kind:
(6) Corr (y ˜, y ˜*)t = α+β TRADEt + It'γ + εt
Where It is a set of relevant variables that have been excluded
from the analysis. A first reason for endogeneity arises because
“TRADE” can act as a proxy for variables belonging to the set
It. A potential candidate for being excluded from the regression
and being correlated with “TRADE” is monetary policy
coordination.  On the one hand, in fact, both theoretical and
empirical (an exception is Clark and Van Wincoop, 2001)
analyses have shown that coordination of monetary policy may
have a positive impact on business-cycle comovement
13. On the
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13 CHECCHI D. (1989) has supported the idea that business-cycle comovement
between G-7 countries has increased since the mid 70’s because of the process of
convergence in real rates of return, due both to market development and to moreother hand, it is reasonable to expect a positive relation between
trade intensity and monetary policy coordination, especially in
Europe where incentives to coordinate macroeconomic policies
were more intense within  the European Monetary System
(EMS). In fact, as OCA theory suggests, the benefits to
participate in a fixed exchange rate regime are positively linked
to the extent of bilateral trade so that we should expect
participation in the EMS (and consequently coordination of
monetary policies) being a positive function of bilateral trade
linkages. Moreover, the EMS itself should have contributed to
enhance trade linkages between countries that are part of the
agreement. As a result, in the sample period considered, one
should expect convergence in monetary policy to occur more
intensively between countries with strong trade relations: as
section 4.2 shows, such a claim is confirmed in the data. Hence,
the exclusion of a measure of monetary policy coordination from
equation  (5) would bias upward β. A second concern for
endogeneity has been made by Imbs (2003) who has noted that
countries with asynchronous cycles are likely to trade more than
countries with a greater extent of real comovement. Simultaneity
would thus underestimate the “trade effect”.
Table 1 summarizes the main sources of inconsistency of OLS
and the “likely” direction of the bias of β when estimating equation
(5) with OLS. In view of these concerns, Frankel and Rose
proposed IV estimation of equation (5) relying on a set of
instruments borrowed from gravity models of international trade:
geographic and cultural  proximity
14.
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similar monetary policies; a second reason, built on a “discipline argument”, has
been sustained by ARTIS M.J. - ZHANG W. (1995), who have suggested that monetary
policy may itself be a source of shocks. Participation in a fixed exchange rate
regime, producing more coordination, should reduce idiosyncratic behaviour and
should enhance real comovement. As an evidence, the two authors reported the
emergence of a “European business cycle” during the period of the European
Monetary System (EMS).
14 Geographic proximity is measured by a dummy variable that takes the value
of 1 if two countries share the same border and by the distance (in miles) between
the biggest cities between country pairs, while cultural proximity by a “common
language” dummy variable. See the Appendix. 3.2 Are Geography and Language Good Instruments?
The issue raised here concerns the validity of the set of
instruments adopted in Frankel and Rose’s estimation of (5).
Although there is no doubt that bilateral trade is highly correlated
with geographic and cultural factors, it is reasonable as well to
assume that these factors affect the international  correlation of
business cycles not only through the trade channel. Gruben, Koo
and Millis (2002), whose argument is summarized in Graph 1,
were the first to make this point. The idea is as follows: geography
and language proximity may affect the synchronization of business
cycles also through other institutional and economic channels.
Countries sharing the same border and the same culture
(language) are likely to have a greater extent of factor mobility,
more similar institutions and more coordinated policies, all things
that, ceteris paribus, should have a positive influence on business-
cycle comovement. If such claims were confirmed in the data, it
would cast doubts on the exogeneity assumption of the set of
instruments proposed by Frankel and Rose.
Gruben, Koo and Millis did not test this hypothesis explicitly.
Rather, they estimated a variant of equation (6) by OLS, including
in  It the set of instruments adopted by Frankel and Rose. Their
idea was to use geography and language to proxy for factor mobility
and monetary policy coordination. The results of their estimation
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TABLE 1
SOURCES OF INCONSISTENCY OF OLS ESTIMATION 
OF β IN EQ. (5)
Source of inconsistency Direction of the bias
Measurement errors 




of “TRADE” Overestimation of β
(Omitted variable bias)suggest a much lower “trade effect” (circa 50% smaller). In part,
this finding is consistent with the recent literature that has further
investigated the relation between trade integration and the
international comovement of business cycles, (e.g. Imbs, 2003,
2004; Kose, Prasad and Terrones, 2003). Nonetheless, their
econometric procedure may be questioned on two grounds: OLS
estimation of equation (6) does not consider measurement errors
and simultaneity that, as argued in the previous section, works to
bias  β towards 0; moreover, the use of proxies does not make it
possible to distinguish among the determinants of real comovement
that have been made explicit in Graph 1.
4. - Empirical Analysis 
This section deals with the relation between trade intensity and
business-cycle comovement for a group of European countries. The
aim is to provide an estimation of the “trade effect” which is robust
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35
GRAPH 1
THE GRUBEN, KOO AND MILLIS HYPOTHESIS”
Source: GRUBEN W - KOO J. - MILLIS E. (2003, page 21). A thick line indicates









Trade ⇔with regard to the econometric problems highlighted in the
previous section. We extend the work of Frankel and Rose and
Gruben, Koo and Millis by explicitly considering: i) the process
of monetary and financial convergence that has taken place in
Europe from the mid 70’s onwards; ii) the role of fiscal policy
coordination. Fiscal policy co-ordination, as well as monetary
policy, may indeed have positive effects on business-cycle
comovement: first, fiscal policy may be itself a source of shock
for an economy so that its coordination, preventing idiosyncratic
behaviour, should increase real comovement; secondly, coordinat-
ion of fiscal policies may increase business-cycle correlation
between countries when the geographic distribution of shocks is
symmetric. 
The benchmark framework is that of equation (6). The first
subsection describes the data set used. Then the focus is on the
descriptive analysis of the main variable involved. Finally,
estimation of the parameters and a sensitivity analysis are
performed.
4.1 Description of the Data Set
The analysis deals with countries belonging to the EU-14
15
observed between 1972 and 2004, the time span being split into
five sub-samples
16. The choice of dividing the set of observations
into sub-samples rather than relying on a cross-sectional
specification is dictated by two main concerns:
— A panel structure makes it possible to increase the sample
size and enhance the precision by which parameters are estimated. 
— A panel structure allows controlling for sub-sample stability
of the parameters, this appearing important given the large time
span considered in the analysis.
As far as the splitting rule is concerned, it has been decided
to consider sub-samples made up of seven years
17. Such criterion
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15 The countries are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK. 
16 The sub-periods are: 1) 1972-1978; 2) 1979-1985; 3) 1986-1992; 4) 1993-1999;
5) 2000-2004. has the main advantage of linking each sub-period to a particular
phase in the construction of the European Monetary Union
18,
enhancing the ability to interpret the time series behaviour of the
variables. Section 4.4 checks for the robustness of our results with
respect to this arbitrary division in the set of observations.
Real comovement is measured by the cross-country correlation
coefficient of cyclical GDP growth rate. For each country pair (e.g.
France-Germany) one measure of real comovement is observed in
each sub-period, so that the maximum sample size is made up of
455 observations. Business cycle is measured as the difference
between actual and trend GDP growth rates. The trend component
of real GDP growth rate is isolated using two alternative filters:
i) Baxter and King (1999) band pass filter (CICL1); ii) Hodrik and
Prescott filter (CICL2). Although the Baxter and King band-pass
filter has become a standard in this literature, the adoption of the
Hodrick and Prescott’s filter makes the analysis more comparable
with that of Frankel and Rose. Moreover, an alternative
measurement of the business cycle may furnish some robustness
checks to the results.
Frankel and Rose’s measure of bilateral trade intensity has
become a benchmark in literature. Denoting by TRADEijt bilateral
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17 Except the last sub-sample, which is made up of five years due to lack of
data.
18  See TSOUKALIS L. (1997) for this classification. The sub-samples
approximately coincide with the following phases of the process of monetary
unification: 1) 1972-1978: failure of the first attempt to construct a currency area
in Europe (Werner Report) and period of high exchange rate’s instability in Europe;
2) 1979-1985: First and second phase of the European Monetary System (EMS);
3) 1986-1992: Third phase of the EMS described by high stability of exchange rate
and by the enlargement of the agreement to new Mediterranean members of the
European Community; 4) 1993-1999: Crises of the European Monetary System and
Maastricht convergence policies; 5) 2000-2004 Birth of the European Monetary
Union. Xijt (Mijt) being the total exportation (importation) from country j
to country i and vice-versa. This indicator measures the relevan-
ce of bilateral trade between country i and country j over their
total trading activities in sub-period t, so that it is reasonable to
expect TRADEijt to be large whenever the two countries have
strong trade linkages. However, it may prove to be inadequate in
situations where the countries considered differ remarkably as re-
gard to their relative size. In particular, whenever country i and
country j are characterized by dissimilar levels of economic acti-
vity, TRADEijt may register low numerical values
19 even in situa-
tions where the small economy highly depends on the large one.
Section 4.4 explores the effects of this issue in more detail.
As it has been discussed above, fiscal and monetary policy
convergence should positively influence real comovement. At this
point the problem relates to their quantitative measurement. As
far as monetary coordination is concerned, the following distance
indicator is proposed:
INTijt = ∑k |rik - rjk| / k
r being the short term real rate of return and k being the number
of years in each sub-period. This indicator captures both the
tendency towards financial integration and monetary policy
convergence. The greater this indicator, the greater is the spread
of short term real rate of return between country i and country j
in sub-period t. 
The measurement of fiscal policy coordination poses more
problems. Studies that sought to gauge the impact of fiscal policy
convergence on real comovement (e.g. Clark and Van Wincoop;
2001, Bergman, 2004; Darvas, Rose and Szapàry, 2005) have all used
various indicators based on the fiscal balance. Incidentally, there
are very good reasons to think that those measures may induce
reverse causality
20. Policy makers, in fact, partly target real variables
when deciding policies, and the output gap is without doubt one
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19 This appear to be the case whenever the small economy highly depends on
its trade relations with the large country and the large economy is an open and
well diversified (as far as trade partners are concerned) economy.
20 DARVAS Z. - ROSE A.K. - SZAPÀRY G. (2005) have made this concern explicit
by using instrumental variables to correct the reverse causality problem.of the variables they look at. As it is explained below, this may
render problematic the determination of the direction of causality
between business-cycle synchronization and policy convergence. Let
us consider two countries (e.g. France and Germany) facing a
positive phase of their cycle. If policy makers adopt countercyclical
fiscal policies, an improvement in the fiscal balance should be
observed in both countries. As a result, for the country pair
considered, the econometrician registers a positive association
between comovement of business cycles and convergence in fiscal
positions although this correlation would not reflect causality of the
latter event. Moreover, such a problem appears even worse when
considering the role of automatic stabilizers: even when the
discretionary component of fiscal policy is not sensitive to the
output gap, a convergence of fiscal balances is going to be observed
whenever the two countries are facing similar phase of the cycle.
The identification problem discussed above may be attenuated by
two considerations. First, existing empirical works on European
countries point out the low sensitivity of the discretionary
component of fiscal policy to the output gap, especially in the first
part of the sample period considered (e.g. Gali and Perotti, 2003).
Moreover, indicators of fiscal policy convergence can be constructed
using the cyclically adjusted
21 fiscal balance, this contributing to
reduce the effects of reverse casuality. Consistently, we propose three
different measures of fiscal policy co-ordination
22:
FISC(z)ijt = ∑k |Dizk – Djzk| / k
where Dizk is:
— fiscal balance, defined as the difference between government
revenues and expenditures (FISC1ijt);
— cyclically adjusted balance, defined as the fiscal balance net
of its component attributable to the effect of the cycle (FISC2ijt);
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21 In order to compute the cyclical component of net lending we adopt the
procedure in GIORNO C.  et AL. (1995): the elasticity of the fiscal balance to the
output gap is multiplied by the output gap. Elasticities are from VAN DER NOORD
P.  (2000) (sub-periods 1-4) and from GIRUARD N. - ANDRÈ C. (2005) (sub-period: 5).
The output gap is the difference between actual and trend (H-P filtered) GDP
growth rate.




A detailed description of data sources is in Table 9 in the
Appendix.
4.2 Descriptive Analysis
Summary statistics concerning the variables involved in the
analysis are presented in the Appendix. The first point worth
mentioning concerns the evidence of an upward trend in
business-cycle comovement. Table 10 shows a moderate evidence
for an increase in intra-European synchronization of cycles,
although this path seems to depend on the variable we adopt: the
CICL2 median tends to increase monotonically over time, while
the same does not happen for CICL1. To investigate this aspect
further, Graph 2 presents kernel density estimates (for CICL1) in
three sub-periods (1972-1978; 1986-1992; 2000-2004). The graph
displays evidence of bi-modal distribution, consistent with a core-
periphery pattern already highlighted in literature (Bayoumi and
Eichengreen, 1993; De Cecco and Perri, 1996). The evolution of
the distribution over time also displays an interesting course:
while the two modes seem to converge during the 80s there is a
tendency for polarization in the late 90s, although the high
comovement mode displays a much greater fraction of the
observations.
As far as the other variables involved are concerned, their
behaviour over time is somewhat expected: integration of financial
markets and coordination of monetary policy starting from the
second oil price shock has led to an increase in the similarity of
short term real rates of return between European countries,
although this tendency has stopped in the last sub-period
25; fiscal
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23  The primary balance is the fiscal balance net of public debt’s interest
expenditure.
24 For a description of this indicator see BLANCHARD O. (1990).
25  This is entirely due to the increase in inflation differential which has
characterized the Euro area in the last years. For possible explanations of this
phenomenon, see HONOHAN P. - LANE P.  (2003).policy has converged greatly starting from the fourth sub-period
(which coincides with the convergence process induced by the
Maastricht rules)
26; bilateral trade intensity has on average
increased throughout the sample.
Tables 11 and 12 in the Appendix report simple correlation
coefficients between the dependent variable and the regressors.
For almost all the sub-periods, with the exception of the
“Maastricht convergence process” (fourth sub-period), the signs
are those expected: a greater extent of divergence in
macroeconomic policies and lower trade intensity are associated
with lower real comovement. Moreover, it is interesting to notice
(Table 13) that countries with higher bilateral trade linkages are
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26 This is true when measuring fiscal policy coordination with FISC1 (fiscal
balance) and FISC2 (cyclically adjusted fiscal balance). When we adopt FISC3
(fiscal impulse), there is no evidence for convergence in sub-periods 4 and 5. This
is somewhat intuitively clear since the compliance with European fiscal policy
rules concerns the public budget rather than the primary balance.
GRAPH 2












Source: elaboration based on OECD.characterized by more intense similarities of their real rates of
returns, confirming the conjectures of section 3.1. It is possible




Before presenting the baseline model, Frankel and Rose’s
specification is first estimated using our dataset. This test may
help to understand if the different time horizon and the different
sample of countries covered may alter the results. 
Table 2 compares the estimation of β in equation (5) across
the two samples: they look very similar, although both OLS and
IV estimations adopting our dataset display a wider effect of trade
intensity on business-cycle comovement. So the quantitative
prediction of the model does not change much when considering
only European countries: rising bilateral trade by one standard
deviation leads to an increase of 0.1 in the average cross-country
correlation coefficient of business cycles.
Our baseline equation is
28:
(7) Corr (y ˜, y ˜*)t = α+β TRADEijt + γINTijt + δFISC(z)ijt + εt
Two alternative estimation techniques are proposed: OLS
and IV
29. Tables 3 and 4 present the benchmark results
respectively for CICL1 and CICL2. Moreover, the robustness of
benchmark estimates is checked with respect to: i) sample period
stability of the estimated parameters; ii) alternative sub-sample’s
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27 This may be the result of a spurious relation. In particular, political economy
literature has pointed out that institutions matter in the conduction of national
fiscal policy, see PERSSON T. - TABELLINI G. (1999). As a result, it is reasonable to
expect countries with similar institutions having more similar fiscal policies. On
the other hand, similar institutions may be the reflection of cultural linkages which
positively affect bilateral trade. This may in principle explain the weak relation we
have found between trade intensity and our indicator of fiscal policy convergence.
28  We  use the natural logarithm of TRADE as in the Frankel and Rose
specification.
29 Instruments are those employed by Frankel and Rose. See Table 9 in the
statistical annex.division of the set of observations; iii) presence of outliers; iv)
country size.
Results of benchmark estimations suggest three main points:
First, fiscal policy convergence is associated with a greater
extent of business-cycle comovement. This result applies
irrespectively of the variable used to measure real comovement
(CICL1 and CICL2), and irrespectively of the variable adopted to
measure convergence in fiscal policies. Despite the identification
problem highlighted in the previous section, the coefficients
associated to the variable FISC2 are very similar to those
associated to the variable FISC1; a possible explanation relies in
the fact that our fiscal convergence variables are averaged over
seven years, this contributing to cancel the effects of the cycle.
The effect of fiscal policy convergence on business-cycle
comovement appears quantitatively relevant: a shift from the third
to the first quartile in the distribution of FISC2 is associated to a
26% increase in the cross-country correlation coefficient of cyclical
GDP (CICL1) from its mean value. Similar results have been
independently reached by Bergman (2004) and Darvas, Rose and
Szapàry (2005).
Trade and Business-Cycle Comovement, etc. L. BOCOLA
43
TABLE 2
MEASURING THE TRADE EFFECT ADOPTING FRANKEL 
AND ROSE’S METHODOLOGY
Our data set Frankel and Rose 
data set
CICL1 CICL2
OLS estimation of β 0.09 0.061 0.057
(0.00) 0.01 (0.00)
IV estimation of β 0.104 0.095 0.087
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
R
2 0.04 0.03 0.04
Obs. 438 438 840
Note: Estimation of Equation (5). In the Frankel and Rose equation the
dependent variable is the cross country correlation of GDP growth rate (de-
trended adopting the H-P filter). P-value (robust) on a two tailed test that the
coefficients equal 0.Second, a lower spread in real rates of return is associated
with greater extent of business-cycle correlation. Despite being
negative in all our estimates, the coefficient γ in equation (7) is
most of the time not significantly different from zero at
conventional statistical level. Incidentally, it is comforting that the
p-values (two tailed) are stable across the twelve specification
ranging from 39% to 6%. 
Finally, more intense trade linkages are associated with
greater synchronization of cycles. This result holds for both
CICL1 and CICL2 and for both the estimation procedures,




CICL1 CICL1 CICL1 CICL1 CICL1 CICL1
(OLS) (OLS) (OLS) (IV) (IV) (IV)
TRADE 0.074 0.09 0.09 0.062 0.059 0.073







INT –0.013 –0.005 –0.01 –0.016 –0.011 –0.016
(0.27) (0.39) (0.39) (0.33) (0.33) (0.22)
R
2 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.103
F test 13.83 15.93 14.08 9.57 12.59 7.87
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Hansen J test 3.6 3.9 3.1
(0.16) (0.13) (0.20)
Obs. 432 418 418 432 418 418
TEST 0.09 0.07 0.15
Note: Based on estimation of equation (7). CICL1 as dependent variable. Constant
omitted. F test on the joint significance of the coefficients. Hansen J test on the
exogeneity of instruments to eq. (7) (P-value in parentheses). P-value (robust) on
two tailed tests in parentheses. The row “TEST” report p-values of the null
hypothesis that the coefficient β estimated in equation (7) is not significantly lower
(one tailed test) than that estimated in equation (5). suggesting the robustness of Frankel and Rose’s findings.
Incidentally, the size of this effect is lower than that estimated
without controlling for policy coordination. The last column in
Tables 3 and 4 reports the p-values of the null hypothesis that
the coefficient on TRADE in the IV estimation of (7) is not
significantly lower than that resulting from IV estimation of
equation (5). The null hypothesis is rejected at conventional level
most of the times. 
We now consider some sensitivity checks for our benchmark
estimates.




CICL2 CICL2 CICL2 CICL2 CICL2 CICL2
(OLS) (OLS) (OLS) (IV) (IV) (IV)
TRADE 0.043 0.05 0.059 0.069 0.06 0.071







INT –0.021 –0.017 –0.02 –0.016 –0.015 –0.017
(0.06) (0.15) (0.09) (0.20) (0.23) (0.16)
R
2 0.05 0.05 0.5 0.5 0.05 0.5
F test 6.81 7.65 7.43 6.75 7 6.75
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Hansen J test 4.06 3.9 3.7
(0.13) (0.13) (0.15)
Obs. 432 418 418 432 418 418
TEST 0.12 0.09 0.12
Note: Based on estimation of equation (7). CICL2 as dependent variable. Constant
omitted. F test on the joint significance of the coefficients. Hansen J test on the
exogeneity of instruments to eq. (7) (P-value in parentheses). P-value (robust) on
two tailed tests in parentheses. The row “TEST” reports p-values of the null
hypothesis that the coefficient β estimated in equation (7) is not significantly lower
(one tailed test) than that estimated in equation (5).4.4 Sensitivity Analysis
30
A first check is to consider how the partial correlations change
when varying the sample period adopted. We do this in the
benchmark specification by excluding one sub-period at a time
(Table 14 in the appendix). As can be seen, the coefficient on
FISC2 is surprisingly stable across sub-samples: when the
dependent variable is CICL1, it fluctuates around –0.025, which
is also the benchmark result. Moreover, its statistical significance
is robust with regard to this exercise. Also TRADE, to a lesser
extent, displays a good degree of stability in both the point
estimates and its statistical significance. The worst performer is
INT, which displays a high degree of variability in both the point
estimates and the 95% confidence bands.
As discussed in section 4.1, the division of the set of
observations into five sub-samples is rather arbitrary. To check
whether our results are robust with respect to alternative splitting
rules we estimate equation (7) on:
— The entire sample (cross-sectional specification)
— Two sub-periods (1972-1987; 1988-2004) sample.
Results are presented in Table 5. As can be seen, the main
findings of the analysis seem to be preserved. The signs of the
coefficients are those expected; their statistical significance
appears low in the cross-sectional specification (columns 1 and
2), but increases substantially when dividing the sample into two
sub-periods. This pattern may be due to the low number of
observations in the cross-sectional specification.
Further, it is checked whether results are robust with respect
to the presence of outliers. Outliers are identified as observations
(for both the dependent and independent variable) whose
numerical value lies below (above) the first (third) quartile by a
factor equal to three times the interquartile range (q3-q1). This
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30 Results are presented just for the correlation coefficient of cyclical GDP de-
trended using the Baxter and King band-pass filter. Figures are very similar when
using the Hodrick-Prescott filter and can be made available by the author upon
request.amounts to excluding twelve observations
31 in the sample. Results
are reported in Table 6. Controlling for outliers does not affect the
robustness of the coefficients for bilateral trade and fiscal policy
convergence. Rather, the coefficient on monetary policy
convergence now becomes significantly different from zero at
conventional levels.
As discussed in section 4.1, the trade intensity indicator may
prove to be inadequate in capturing phenomena of economic
dependence of a small economy on a large one. This may be
problematic in the estimation of equation (7) because, whenever
a small economy is remarkably dependent on its trading relation
with a large one, one is likely to observe a large extent of
correlation of their indicators of economic performance
32. As a
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31 All these observations relate to the variable INT. Moreover, nine of these
observations come from the Maastricht convergence sub-period while the other
three excluded observations belong to the second sub-period. 
32 In this particular situation it would be probably more accurate to speak of
causation rather than comovement: a shock hitting the large economy is likely to
affect heavily the small one, while the opposite would not be true. I am indebt to
an anonymous referee for calling attention to this issue.
TABLE 5
CONTROLLING FOR ALTERNATIVE SUB-SAMPLE DIVISIONS
Cross-sectional Panel (two sub-periods)
Specification Specification
CICL1 CICL1 CICL1 CICL1
(IV) (IV) (IV) (IV)
TRADE 0.11 0.068 0.11 0.076






2 0.25 0.26 0.18 0.21
Obs. 90 90 180 180
TEST 0.23 0.13
Note: Based on estimation of equation (7). CICL1 as dependent variable. Constant
omitted.  P-values (robust) on two tailed tests in parentheses. The row “TEST”
reports P-values of the null hypothesis that the coefficient β estimated in equation
(7) is not significantly lower (one tailed test) than that estimated in equation (5).result, in a cross-section of countries, it could be in principle
possible to associate very high degree of business-cycle correlation
to low values of the trade intensity indicator, this attenuating the
estimated β. 
In order to detect whether the problem of country size is
relevant in the European sample we propose a test. To show how
it works, let us consider two country pairs, the first including
economies of approximately the same size (e.g. France-Italy) while
the second consisting of countries of different size (e.g. France-
Belgium). Let us assume that the two country pairs have
approximately the same numerical level of the variable “TRADEt”.
If the problem highlighted above is relevant in the sample, then
the econometrician should observe a greater degree of business-




CICL1 CICL1 CICL1 CICL1 CICL1 CICL1
(OLS) (OLS) (OLS) (IV) (IV) (IV)
TRADE 0.077 0.10 0.10 0.067 0.06 0.078







INT –0.025 –0.017 –0.02 –0.023 –0.022 –0.027
(0.05) (0.19) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.04)
R
2 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.10
F test 15.82 17.77 16.21 11.41 11.92 9.78
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Hansen J test 3.537 3.48 3.1
(0.17) (0.17) (0.21)
Obs. 420 406 406 420 406 406
TEST 0.12 0.10 0.20
Note: Based on estimation of equation (7). CICL1 as dependent variable. Constant
omitted. F test on the joint significance of the coefficients. Hansen J test on the
exogeneity of instruments to eq. (7) (robust  P-value in parentheses). P-value
(robust) on two tailed tests in parentheses. The row “TEST” reports p-values of
the null hypothesis that the coefficient β estimated in equation (7) is not
significantly lower (one tailed test) than that estimated in equation (5).cycle comovement between France and Belgium than that between
France and Italy. Repeating the same reasoning for all the country
pairs, the  marginal effect of TRADEijt should be expected to be
wider whenever the countries considered differ in their size.
Accordingly, the following equation is estimated :
(8) Corr (y ˜, y ˜*)t = α + β TRADEjit + φ TRADEjit×SIZEijt +
+ γINTijt+ δFISCijt + εt
Where SIZEijt is a binary variable so defined
33:
If the sample suffers from the problem highlighted above, φ
should be significantly greater than zero. Table 7 presents the
SIZE
1i f c o untry ( ) is small and
ijt
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33 A country is defined to be “small” (“large”) if its real GDP is lower (larger)
than the 25
th (75
th) percentile in sub-period t.
TABLE 7
ESTIMATION OF EQ. (8)
CICL1 CICL1 CICL1
(IV) (IV) (IV)
TRADE*SIZE 0.003 0.003 0.002
(0.97) (0.97) (0.80)








INT –0.012 –0.01 –0.016
(0.30) (0.30) (0.20)
R
2 0.10 0.10 0.09
Obs. 418 418 418
TEST 0.09 0.07 0.15
Note: Based on estimation of equation of eq. (8). CICL1 as dependent variable.
Constant omitted. P-values (robust) on two tailed tests in parentheses. The row “TEST”
reports P-values of the null hypothesis that the  coefficient β estimated in equation
(8) is not significantly lower (one tailed test) than that estimated in equation (5).results. As can be seen, the null hypothesis that φ equals zero is
never rejected at conventional level. 
4.5 Summary of Results
The benchmark analysis and the robustness checks point out
three main results:
First, countries with similar fiscal policies tend to have
more similar cycles. This result is robust to variation in the
sample period considered. Moreover, the discussion in section
4.1 and the adoption of cyclically adjusted measure of the fiscal
balance seems to suggest that the estimated δ in equation (7)
reflects the causal impact of fiscal policy convergence on real
comovement.
Second, a low spread of short term real rates of return is
associated to a greater extent of business-cycle synchronization.
The benchmark estimates display a low statistical significance and
a low extent of sub-sample stability of the parameter γ in equation
(7), this casting doubts on the robustness of these results.
Nonetheless, sensitivity analysis has shown that the statistical
significance of this coefficient increases when cheeking for the
presence of outliers in the sample.
Third, greater trade intensity is associated to high degree of
cross-country correlation coefficient of business cycles, confirming
the claim by Frankel and Rose and other studies testing their
hypothesis. Such an effect appears robust even when controlling in
the econometric specification for coordination of macroeconomic
policies. In this latter case, by the way, the size of the effect
significantly weakens. Graph 3 presents weighted average of our
benchmark estimates of the trade effect with those estimated
according to Frankel and Rose’s procedure. 
The striking result concerns the fact that benchmark IV
estimates are on average 33% lower than those estimated with
Frankel and Rose’s procedure. To show why this is the case, one
may consider the analytic expression for the IV coefficient of β
from equation (5).
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TRÂDE being the vector of fitted values from the first stage
regression, and y being our dependent variable. Assuming that the
true model is, instead, represented by (7) and assuming the
orthogonality between TRÂDE and the disturbance term in
equation (7), we can express (a) as:
(10)
The sample correlation of TRÂDE and the policy variables is
given in Table 8. As can be seen, the sample moments seem to
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GRAPH 3
COMPARISON BETWEEN OUR BENCHMARK RESULTS 
AND FRANKEL AND ROSE’S METHODOLOGY







F & R methodology  benchmark OLS
benchmark IVconfirm the idea put forth by Gruben, Koo and Millis that
countries sharing the same border and the same culture (language)
are characterized by a more intense coordination of their policies.
The exclusion of the policy variables from (5) is, thus, expected
to produce an overestimation of β in Frankel and Rose’s
specification, since:
(11)
5. - Conclusions: Policy Implication for EMU 
A symmetric distribution of shocks is one of the criteria that
the theory developed by Mundell (1961) identifies as being a
determinant for the economic success of a currency area. Building
a common monetary policy may be inefficient and may produce
macroeconomic stability problems when countries taking part in
the arrangement are characterized by a low extent of business-
cycle synchronization. This view has been criticized by Frankel
and Rose (1998), who have argued that this criterion should be
considered as endogenous to the construction of the currency area:
in fact, fixed exchange rates should stimulate intra-union trade
intensity thus contributing to more synchronous cycles and to a
better functioning of the common monetary policy. As a support
of their thesis, the two authors have estimated a positive and
sizable effect of bilateral trade intensity on business-cycle
     
  β β IV p kk → + > 0
RIVISTA DI POLITICA ECONOMICA NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 2006
52
TABLE 8
CORRELATION BETWEEN REGRESSORS AND TRÂ ·DE
TRÂDE





INT –0.19comovement using a panel of OECD countries. This paper has
extended Frankel and Rose’s econometric approach. Building on
the considerations presented by Gruben, Koo and Millis (2002) we
have explicitly taken into account the role of policy convergence
on real comovement. Our empirical analysis suggest three main
points: 
i. Coordination of macroeconomic policies seems to help
business-cycle comovement: countries that have similar fiscal
policy seem to co-move more than countries with idiosyncratic
policies, this result being robust with regard to a number of
sensitivity checks. Moreover, we have also found a weak evidence
that convergence in short term real interest rates has been
beneficial for the intra-European comovement of business cycles,
especially when checking for the presence of outliers; 
ii. Bilateral trade intensity positively affects business-cycle
correlation, thus confirming Frankel and Rose’s claim. The effect
remains statistically significant even when including in the
analysis the policy coordination variables, this suggesting the
robustness of Frankel and Rose’s study. 
iii. European data appear to support the idea put forth by
Gruben, Koo and Millis on the endogeneity of the set of
instruments proposed by Frankel and Rose. Countries being
geographically close and sharing the same language tend to have
more similar fiscal and monetary policies. This furnishes an
explanation of the discrepancies between our estimates of the
“trade effect” and the one implied by Frankel and Rose’s
procedure. The downward revision is sizable, ranging on average
between 36%-33%.
These findings suggest a number of implications for the
functioning of the European Monetary Union (EMU).
As a first point, the results are consistent with the view that
patterns of business-cycle comovement in Europe are not going
to change much in the short run as a result of the adoption of
the Euro. On the one hand, recent empirical estimations of the
impact of the Euro on intra-EMU trade have not identified a
dramatic boost after 1998 (see De Nardis and Vicarelli, 2003;
Micco, Ordonez and Stein, 2003). On the other hand, our
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comovement suggests that a move from the median to the 75
th
percentile of TRADE (which correspond to an increase in bilateral
trade intensity by 150%) increases business-cycle correlation by
15% of the mean value. Together, these two factors may lead us
conjecture that Frankel and Rose’s hypothesis is likely to operate
in Europe in the long run. 
Another implication of the analysis is that fiscal policy rule
may be to some extent beneficial for the macroeconomic policy
framework of the EMU. Early studies on the rationales of the
Maastricht treaty and on the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)
(Lamfalussy, 1989; Bovemberg, Kremer and Masson, 1991; Buiter,
Corsetti and Roubini, 1993; Artis and Winckler, 1999) have
identified financial stability and ECB credibility as the main
benefits for the adoption of fiscal policy rules. The results in this
paper suggest that fiscal policy rules may also help the stabilizing
effort of the European Central Bank: to the extent that the SGP
prevents idiosyncratic behaviour in the carrying out of domestic
fiscal policies, we should observe more synchronous cycles
between European countries and thus a more efficient common
monetary policy. This conclusion, nonetheless, needs to be
weighted with the fact that domestic fiscal policies in Europe have
become a more important buffer for negative shocks than in the
past: the adoption of the single monetary policy, the absence of a
federal risk sharing arrangement (e.g. Farina and Tamborini, 2002)
and the low extent of intra-European labor mobility are all factors
suggesting that national fiscal policies are one of the few
instruments that European countries have to counteract
idiosyncratic movements in real variables. The solution of this
trade-off between “European rules” and “national discretion”
represents one of the crucial points Europe should face to improve
its short run macroeconomic policy frame and to increase the
economic success of the Euro.
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Variable Description Source Missing Note
Observations
CICL1 Cross country  OECD // //
correlation coefficient (Retrospective















FISC2 Our elaboration Portugal See note 16
on OECD (1972-1978) in the text for
(Retrospective the computation
statistics, 2002; of the cyclical
OECD component of




INT AMECO database Greece Private










Variable Description Source Missing Note
Observations
TRADE ITCS database, data on Austria
OECD are from
of Trade IMF 
direction of
Trade statistics
Ling Dummy variable Frankel and
that takes the Rose
value of 1 if the data-set
two countries share
the same language
Instruments Lndist Natural logarithm Frankel and
of the distance  Rose
(in miles) between the  data-set
two “economic” capital 
of the country pair
Adjacent Dummy variable  Frankel and
that takes the Rose
value of 1 if the data-set
two countries
share the same
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TABLE 11
CORRELATION AMONG REAL COMOVEMENT (CICL1) 
AND REGRESSORS
1972-1978 1979-1985 1986-1992 1993-1999 2000-2004 1972-2004
TRADE 0.24 0.06 0.20 –0.03 0.39 0.20
FISC1 –0.61 –0.19 0.02 0.05 –0.28 –0.29
FISC2 –0.67 –0.22 0.005 0.05 –0.25 –0.29
FISC3 –0.67 –0.20 –0.14 –0.18 –0.04 –0.25
INT 0.14 –0.17 –0.14 0.13 –0.10 –0.16
TABLE 12
CORRELATION AMONG REAL COMOVEMENT (CICL2) 
AND REGRESSORS
1972-1978 1979-1985 1986-1992 1993-1999 2000-2004 1972-2004
<
TRADE 0.37 0.02 0.17 –0.03 0.24 0.19
FISC1 –0.21 –0.12 –0.06 0.19 –0.13 –0.13
FISC2 –0.20 –0.16 –0.09 0.12 –0.15 –0.16
FISC3 –0.32 –0.15 –0.33 0.04 –0.04 –0.12
INT –0.002 –0.33 –0.1 0.13 –0.24 –0.15
TABLE 13
CORRELATION BETWEEN REGRESSORS
TRADE FISC1 FISC2 FISC3 INT
TRADE *****
FISC1 –0.19 ****
FISC2 –0.20 0.95 * * *
FISC3 –0.12 0.50 0.52 * *
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